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Solo Spiritu: Thomas Aquinas’s Pneumatological Pisteology 
The doctrine of faith is at the heart of three disputes in theology. First, there is what I will 
call the ecumenical dispute between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism regarding the nature 
of faith itself. Second, there is the exegetical dispute over which doctrine of faith is the most 
faithful interpretation of the biblical text, a dispute which is directly related to the ecumenical 
problem. And third, there is a dispute within Thomistic interpretation regarding how Thomas 
Aquinas himself understands faith. The first two problems are helpfully brought together in a 
polemical passage from John Calvin’s Institutes: 
First, we must refute that worthless distinction between formed and unformed faith which 
is tossed about the schools. For they imagine that people who are touched by no fear of 
God, no sense of piety, nevertheless believe whatever it is necessary to know for 
salvation. As if the Holy Spirit, by illuminating our hearts unto faith, were not the witness 
to us of our adoption! And yet they presumptuously dignify that persuasion, devoid of the 
fear of God, with the name “faith” even though all Scripture cries out against it. . . . They 
would have faith to be an assent by which any despiser of God may receive what is 
offered from Scripture. But first they ought to have seen whether every man attains faith 
by his own effort, or whether through it the Holy Spirit is witness of his adoption. 
Therefore they babble childishly in asking whether faith is the same faith when it has 
been formed by a superadded quality; or whether it be a new and different thing. From 
such chatter it certainly looks as if they never thought about the unique gift of the Spirit. 
For the beginning of believing already contains within itself the reconciliation whereby 
man approaches God. But if they weighed Paul’s saying, “With the heart a man believes 
unto righteousness” [Rom. 10:10], they would cease to invent that cold quality of faith.1 
 
Calvin goes on to say that assensus “is more of the heart than of the brain, and more of the 
disposition than of the understanding . . . at least such assent as is revealed in the Scriptures!”  
This passage from Calvin will serve as the platform for my analysis of the third problem—
Thomas’s doctrine of faith in the Summa Theologiae2—which will then shed light on the first 
two problems. In this paper, then, I will attempt to gain clarity on Thomas’s pisteology by 
                                                
1 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, 2 vols. 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 3.2.8. 
2 References to Thomas’s Summa will be to Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province, Complete English ed., 5 vols. (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981); hereafter cited as 
ST. 
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examining (1) his doctrine of creation and providence, (2) the nature of the theological virtues in 
general, and (3) the virtue of faith in particular. I will argue that Thomas has a logological-
pneumatological conception of creation and providence, in which the triune God is actively 
present within nature, eliciting free and virtuous human action in accordance with the Word of 
God. Specifically, by Word and Spirit, God gifts the human person for faith as a free act of 
intellect and will. I will, however, argue that there is a key aporia at the heart of Thomas’s 
pisteology which must be addressed. I will also note that whereas Thomas’s pisteology takes 
Hebrews 11:1 as its starting-point, Calvin and the Reformers take Romans 10:10. Finally, I will 
conclude by suggesting that while this reading of Thomas greatly mitigates some of the classical 
Protestant concerns regarding Thomas—not to mention complicating, if not undermining, the 
anachronistic “Tridentine Thomas” employed by some Catholics—a more fully christological 
pisteology would begin with Hebrews 12:2. 
 
Creation: a logological-pneumatological conception of nature 
The doctrine of faith quickly leads to a mess of Protestant-Catholic polemics regarding 
such issues as theological epistemology, the relation between reason and revelation and the 
corresponding relation between nature and grace, the doctrine of analogy, the nature of Holy 
Scripture and the role of tradition, and, undergirding many of these issues, the doctrine of 
creation and providence. Unfortunately, Thomas Aquinas is too often read as a partisan in such 
debates, despite the fact that using him in this way is anachronistic and often does violence to his 
actual thought on these matters. That’s not to say there are not real differences between Thomas 
and the Reformers—there certainly are—but only to suggest that Protestants might have much to 
gain from giving Thomas a more charitable hearing. In this section, I will wade into some of the 
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core Catholic-Protestant debates, particularly the issue of nature and grace, or reason and 
revelation, and I will do so with an eye toward explicating God’s intimate and providential 
involvement in creation generally and in the faith of the human believer specifically. 
Thomas lays the foundation for his analysis of the virtue of faith early in the Summa, 
where he speaks about God’s relationship with creation. While a complete analysis of Thomas’s 
doctrine of creation is well beyond the scope of this paper, what I will do here is offer a brief 
interpretation of Thomas’s theology of creation and providence as it illuminates the divine 
ground for all human action. First, God’s relation to the world, according to Thomas, is 
established in God’s own triune being, hence the dual discussion of providence in his treatise on 
the essence of God (ST I, qq. 2-26, specifically q. 22) and later in his treatise on creation (ST I, 
qq. 44-119, specifically qq. 103-119).3 While God is not necessarily ordered toward anything 
outside Godself, Thomas makes it clear that “it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in 
itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so 
governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government.”4 God is 
therefore the ens entium, who is “essentially being and essentially good,” from whom 
“everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates” in the first being, i.e., in 
God.5 Creation is therefore a participatio entis, a participation in the being of God: “all beings 
                                                
3 Michael A. Hoonhout, “Grounding Providence in the Theology of the Creator: The Exemplarity of Thomas 
Aquinas,” Heythrop Journal 43, no. 1 (2002): 4-5. Hoonhout notes that Thomas is not simply repeating himself by 
discussing providence in two locations. According to Hoonhout, “The two contexts really are of two radically 
different orders of intelligibility. Providence in the first context has all the perfections of God because it is the 
provident God being discussed; yet providence in the second context has all the features of this world because it 
refers to the providential unfolding that is realized in this world. The first, providence simply, is eternal – that is, 
simultaneously encompassing the whole of created reality (all time, all space) in the simple, perfect and unending 
Now that is God. Providence in this sense is also the sole responsibility of God, since it is the pattern in the divine 
mind and will for the work of perfecting creation. The second sense, divine government, is temporal and the mutual 
co-responsibility of God and creatures” (ibid., 6). 
4 ST I.103.6 resp. 
5 ST I.6.4 resp. 
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apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation [participant esse].”6 
Creation emanates from the divine “universal cause” (causa universali) or “first principle” 
(primo principio) and is thus teleologically ordered to return to God.7 Creation has its origin and 
end in God alone. Creation comes from the Good to the Good by way of the Good. 
Second, while God is related to the world as “first being,” God is more specifically and 
concretely related to creation as the triune Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The doctrine of creation 
has a distinctly trinitarian shape in Thomas’s theology.8 Thomas uses the analogy of a craftsman 
who “works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the love of the will regarding 
some object.” Similarly, he says, “God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is 
His Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost.”9 God creates through intellect and 
will, through Word and Spirit, in accordance with the will of the Father. While creation thus 
belongs to all three persons of the Trinity, there is an order of appropriations: 
For the Son receives [the power of creation] from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from 
both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not receive 
the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said, Through Him all things 
were made [John 1:3], inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another . . . . But to 
the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is attributed that by His sway He 
governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. . . . [T]o the Father 
is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to 
Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual 
agent acts; and therefore it is said: Through Whom all things were made. And to the Holy 
Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which belong both government, which brings things to 
their proper end, and the giving of life—for life consists in a certain interior movement; 
and the first mover is the end, and goodness.10 
 
According to Thomas, the created order is a logological and pneumatological reality. Word and 
Spirit together actualize the creatio ex nihilo and providential governance of creation. In a sense, 
                                                
6 ST I.44.1 resp. 
7 ST I.45.1 resp. 
8 Cf. Anselm K. Min, Paths to the Triune God: An Encounter between Aquinas and Recent Theologies (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 26-39. 
9 ST I.45.6 resp. 
10 ST I.45.6 ad 2. 
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Word and Spirit correspond to creatio originalis and creatio continua, and by virtue of the Word 
made flesh and the Spirit guiding creation to its proper telos, Word and Spirit actualize the 
creatio nova. All of this, of course, flows from the Father’s command. 
Third, God’s trinitarian involvement in creation means that God is intimately present to 
all creaturely reality through Word and Spirit. Before he says anything about creation and 
providence, Thomas grounds the presence of God to creation in the being of God itself in 
accordance with the divine causality. “God is in all things [Deus est in omnibus rebus],” he says, 
because “as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it [Deus adsit ei].” And since 
“being is innermost in each thing [magis intimum cuilibet] and most fundamentally inherent in 
all things [profundius omnibus inest] . . . it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly [et 
intime].”11 God is not only present in all things as the causal ground of all creaturely being, but 
God “acts immediately [immediate agit] in all things,” and thus “nothing is distant from Him, as 
if it could be without God in itself.”12 
In accordance with the logological and pneumatological ground of creation, this active 
presence of God is a relationship of Word and Spirit:  
Just as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by the Word which He begets . . . so 
He loves [diligit] Himself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, insofar as the Holy 
Ghost proceeds as the love of the first goodness [amor bonitatis primae] whereby the 
Father loves [amat] Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that a relation to the 
creature is implied both in the Word and in the proceeding Love, as it were in a 
secondary way, insofar as the divine truth and goodness [veritas et bonitas divina] is the 
principle of understanding and loving [intelligendi et amandi] all creatures.13 
                                                
11 ST I.8.1 resp. This statement about God’s omnipresence sets up Thomas’s first analysis of divine providence, 
where he says that “all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end . . . 
. It necessarily follows that all things inasmuch as they participate [in] existence, must likewise be subject to divine 
providence” (I.22.2 resp.). Then, again, Thomas emphasizes the same point at the start of his treatise on creation, 
where he says that “every being in any way existing is from God. . . . Therefore all beings apart from God are not 
their own being, but are beings by participation” (I.44.1 resp.). And “from the fact that a thing has being by 
participation, it follows that it is caused” (I.44.1 ad 1). 
12 ST I.8.1 ad 3. 
13 ST I.37.2 ad 3 (rev). Cf. Walter H. Principe, “Thomas Aquinas’ Spirituality,” in The Gilson Lectures on 
Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson Series (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008), 193n34. 
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God’s intimate involvement in creation is a divine knowing and loving of the creature through 
Word and Spirit.14 God not only knows and loves Godself, but in the knowing and loving of 
Godself, God also knows and loves the creaturely other. The creature participates in God because 
the pneumatic love of God “embrace[s] all creatures” and ushers them toward their teleological 
fellowship with the triune God: “all created reality, include each human person, is constantly 
being known, spoken, and loved into being within the divine life of the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit.”15 God’s transcendence—which means that God is not one being among others but rather 
“being itself” (ipsum esse),16 and is thus beyond the creaturely antimony between necessity and 
contingency17—does not conflict with God’s immanence; on the contrary, the transcendence of 
God makes possible God’s intimate immanence within all creation as the triune God who knows, 
speaks, and loves each creature and providentially governs them toward the perfect goodness 
from which they came. 
Fourth, God’s providential loving of creation brings all creaturely reality toward its final 
end, the “universal good” (bonum universale).18 The whole of creaturely reality exists as a 
participation in this bonum universale, and thus the world is a bonum particulare in which 
creatures accomplish particular ends. And yet the end of creation itself, the finis totius universi, 
                                                
14 Cf. ST I.45.7 resp.: “Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as 
was said above. For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. 
Therefore in rational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way 
of image, inasmuch as there is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding.” 
15 Principe, “Thomas Aquinas’ Spirituality,” 193. According to Thomas Aquinas, “we say that the Father, by 
the Word or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son love each other and us, by 
the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding” (I.37.2 resp.). 
16 ST I.8.1 resp. 
17 Cf. ST I.22.4 ad 3. 
18 ST I.103.2 resp. Cf. I.103.1 resp.: “For as it belongs to the best to produce the best, it is not fitting that the 
supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing’s ultimate 
perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into 
existence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.” 
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is necessarily “extrinsic to the whole universe.”19 The universal good of creation is extra se; it is 
found in God alone, or rather it is God, through whom all things are made and from whom all 
goods come to us as gifts. Divine providence as the outworking of the divine goodness is the 
governance of creation toward this bonum universale, the bonum essentiale20—i.e., toward God. 
Providence thus guides creation toward a more perfect participation in the Good, a more perfect 
similitudo to God.21 Within the scope of providence, salvation and the reconciliation of the world 
have their proper locus. The “Word made flesh” has its theological significance within the 
metanarrative of God’s trinitarian activity of creation and providence: the Father’s sovereign 
willing of creation, the Word’s wise speaking of creation, and the Spirit’s loving governance of 
creation. 
The consequence of this active providential involvement of God in creation is that the 
entire relationship between nature and grace has to be understood not as a dialectical antinomy 
but as a movement from imperfect participation to perfect participation—from being imperfect 
images of God to being perfect images of God, since “the perfections of all things are so many 
similitudes of the divine being [similitudines divini esse].”22 Nature is in itself a reality gifted and 
governed by Word and Spirit as part of the unfolding of God’s providential plan for all creaturely 
existence. Nature images God insofar as it participates in the goodness of God’s being, which 
actively embraces, knows, and loves the world of nature. By virtue of “a kind of impression from 
God,” nature is necessarily directed toward an end, similar to the way “an arrow is moved so as 
to fly towards a certain point” because of an impression from the archer. The significant 
difference is that “the impression which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that 
                                                
19 ST I.103.2 resp. 
20 ST I.103.4 resp. 
21 See ST I.6.1 resp. 
22 ST I.6.1 ad 2. 
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which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent.”23 God’s 
providential governance is such that creaturely reality is by nature ordered toward its proper telos 
in a non-competitive, non-coercive, loving manner. Nature is necessarily ordered toward 
beatitude, and because this is the work of the transcendent God, there is no competition between 
God’s activity and creaturely activity. Creation lives and moves and has its being within the 
providential grace of God. When it comes to salvific grace, God’s immanent presence, which 
continuously sustains and governs the world, is then “intensified in human persons when the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit dwell in us as friends to be possessed and enjoyed through intimate, 
experiential knowing and loving.”24 The divine knowing and loving operative in creation 
generally is related in a special way with those rational creatures who participate in God to a 
greater and more perfect extent, but always within the providential activity of God. 
What this means is that human beings are by nature moved by God. According to 
Thomas, since God is the first immaterial and thus intellectual being, “God moves the created 
intellect” and “from Him proceeds all intellectual power . . . whether natural or superadded [vel 
naturalem vel superadditam].”25 Similarly, God moves the created will, since the object of the 
will is the good and God is the bonum universale to whom all wills are naturally inclined. For 
this reason “it belongs to God to move the will, but especially . . . by an interior inclination.”26 
And yet, again, because God is the transcendent-triune prime mover, the interior inclination of 
the will is not a violent or forced action, “because He gives the will its own natural inclination 
[propriam inclinationem].”27 In general, Thomas says, God is actively at work in every agent. 
                                                
23 ST I.103.1 ad 3; emphasis added. 
24 Principe, “Thomas Aquinas’ Spirituality,” 194. 
25 ST I.105.3 resp.; emphasis added. 
26 ST I.105.4 resp. 
27 ST I.105.4 ad 1. In the response to the second objection, Thomas says that “to be moved voluntarily is to be 
moved from within . . . yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from 
within is not repugnant to being moved by another” (I.105.4 ad 2). 
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God is the “cause of every operation as its end,” the “cause of action in every agent,” and “He 
also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being.” To put it simply, “because in 
all things God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost [magis 
intimum] in all things, it follows that in all things God works intimately [Deus in omnibus intime 
operetur].”28 
Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of providence sets up his analysis of natural law in the Prima 
Secundae. Thomas identifies four kinds of laws: eternal, natural, human, and divine. A law, he 
says, “is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a 
perfect community.”29 The eternal law is therefore the providential governance of the universe 
according to divine reason. The eternal law (lex aeterna) actively orders the world toward its 
end, which is God: “the end of the Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct 
from Himself.”30 When it comes to the natural law (lex naturalis), Thomas makes it very clear 
that it is not “something different from the eternal law,” because “it is nothing but a 
participation” in the eternal law of God’s governance.31 Since all creaturely reality is “ruled and 
measured by the eternal law . . . it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, 
in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted (ex impressione) on them, they derive their 
respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends.”32 But the rational creature participates in 
the eternal law uniquely “by being provident both for itself and for others,” and thus the rational 
creature shares naturally in the eternal reason, giving it a “natural inclination” toward God. More 
specifically, natural human reason “is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light.”33 In 
                                                
28 ST I.105.5 resp. Thomas also says that “in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as 
operating in nature.” 
29 ST I-II.91.1 resp. 
30 ST I-II.91.1 ad 3. 
31 ST I-II.91.2 ad 1. 
32 ST I-II.91.2 resp. 
33 Ibid. 
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light of the Prima Pars, Thomas’s conception of the natural law is wholly circumscribed by his 
trinitarian theology of creation and providence. Nature’s participation in the eternal law does not 
mean that nature has access to divine truth independent of God’s activity in creation, precisely 
because there is no sphere of creation independent from God. The lex naturalis only has 
significance within the providential scope of the lex aeterna. The impressio of the divine reason 
upon nature needs to be understood as the continuous trinitarian activity of willing, knowing, and 
loving creation. The natural law is a participation in the governance of Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit, and cannot be properly explicated outside of this divine reality. 
Before turning to the virtues and the virtue of faith in particular, it is worth noting the role 
that Thomas then gives grace in relationship to nature in light of his understanding of providence 
and the natural law. The key article comes at the start of his treatise on grace (ST I-II, qq. 109-
14). There he asks whether grace is necessary for the knowledge of any truth. He begins by 
stating that “all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, 
Who is God. And hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it 
cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God; but this motion is according to the plan of 
His providence, and not by a necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly body.”34 In 
accordance with God’s gracious and providential establishment of nature, creaturely realities are 
capable of acting, but only because God brings about this action as part of the actualization of the 
eternal law. Consequently, even though we can distinguish between an “intelligible light” and a 
stronger, superadded “light of grace,” between a natural and a supernatural intelligence, 
we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs Divine help, that 
the intellect may be moved by God to its act. But he does not need a new light added to 
his natural light, in order to know the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his 
natural knowledge. . . . Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost as 
bestowing the natural light, and moving us to understand and speak the truth, but not as 
                                                
34 ST I-II.109.1 resp. 
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dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as bestowing any habitual gift superadded to 
nature. For this only takes place with regard to certain truths that are known and spoken, 
and especially in regard to such as pertain to faith.35 
 
In this key passage, Thomas makes it clear that all natural knowledge of truth derives 
from God’s gracious actualization of the intellect according to divine providence. Specifically, 
the “natural light” is bestowed as a gift of the Holy Spirit who moves within us for the sake of 
attaining natural knowledge of the world. By limiting sanctifying grace to the superadded 
activity of the Spirit in relation to supernatural truth, Thomas does not mean that human beings 
are capable of attaining to natural truth apart from God. Rather, God is always working non-
competitively by Word and Spirit to bring all creaturely realities to their appropriate ends, and 
ultimately to the final end of God’s perfect goodness and the beatific vision of God. All truth 
comes from God, just as nature itself exists as a continual gift of God for the purpose of creating 
friends of God by grace. The virtues, as we will see, have their proper location as the pneumatic 
vehicles for bringing rational creatures into a more perfect participation in the divine being. 
Grace is therefore the intensification of God’s ongoing activity of governance in nature for the 
sake of the eschatological fulfillment and manifestation of the world’s participation in God’s 
eternal goodness. 
In this first section, I have argued for a conception of nature as creation, as the 
“theodramatic stage,” to borrow from Hans Urs von Balthasar, in which God actively works by 
Word and Spirit to accomplish the eternal will of the Father. Creation is a logological-
pneumatological reality, and thus nature is a theological category capable of proper interpretation 
only in accordance with God’s revealing grace. Nature is not a static, independent entity 
incurvatus in se, where rational creatures are enabled to fulfill their creaturely ends apart from 
God’s continual preservation and actualization of reality. Nor is grace a violent intrusion into the 
                                                
35 ST I-II.109.1 resp. and ad 1. 
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world of nature, in which God must act in a competitive manner with creatures to accomplish 
certain supernatural ends. Instead, nature and grace are theologically situated within the narrative 
of God’s providence. Within this trinitarian story of divine willing, knowing, and loving—
corresponding to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—creation is ushered forward toward the universal 
good of perfect participation in the triune life of God. Nature is actively sustained and moved 
forward toward its telos in the gracious embrace of the eternal God. While the natural world thus 
depends upon the grace and love of God at all moments, there is a unique intensification of 
God’s grace and love poured out by the Spirit upon rational creatures as they come to image the 
triune God more perfectly through a life of virtue. Thomas Aquinas provides us with a trinitarian 
iconic-sacramental theology of creation and providence in which soteriology and ethics find their 
proper place within the divine movement of creation from God to God through God—or, more 
specifically, from the Father to the Father by way of Son and Spirit. 
 
Virtue: proper human action within the sphere of divine providence 
Thomas’s account of the virtues is situated at the heart of his theological anthropology, 
between his analysis of human acts and passions and his treatise on the law. His definition of 
virtue builds upon his understanding of habitus, which is “a stable disposition of a human 
capacity for knowledge or desire, through which the capacity is given sufficient determination to 
be exercised through some action.”36 With this definition established, Thomas then categorizes 
the habits according to the various aspects of the human person (e.g., the intellect or the will) and 
distinguishes between natural, acquired, and infused habits. These various distinctions set up 
Thomas’s primary concern, which is the account he gives of the virtues beginning in ST I-II, q. 
                                                
36 Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 
163. Cf. ST I-II.49. 
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55. Virtue, he says, is “a certain perfection of a power,”37 an operative habit for the sake of good 
works. Thomas cites approvingly the definition of virtue provided by Augustine38: “Virtue is a 
good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, 
which God works in us, without us.”39 Thomas makes a couple adjustments, substituting habit 
for quality and noting that the final phrase—“which God works in us, without us”—is only 
applicable to the infused virtues, not to the acquired virtues. In general, Thomas’s account of the 
virtues draws upon both Aristotle and Augustine in order to argue that virtue is a perfect habit 
which brings about human happiness—making the human agent good through good acts in 
accordance with God’s good will for humankind. 
Thomas distinguishes between intellectual, moral, and theological virtues. The 
intellectual virtues are located in the reason, while the moral virtues are located in the appetite, 
which are rational by participation in the intellect. Thomas divides the former into the 
speculative and practical intellect—corresponding to, among others, faith and prudence, 
respectively—and the latter into the irascible and concupiscible powers—corresponding to 
fortitude and temperance. Finally, Thomas locates other virtues in the will, whether theological, 
such as hope and love, or moral, such as justice. He goes on to argue that the moral virtues, along 
with prudence—i.e., the virtues connected with the appetite and the practical intellect—
constitute the four cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude.40 These are 
distinct from the three theological virtues in that they are related to natural human ends, toward 
finite human happiness. The cardinal virtues concern a happiness which is available to human 
beings through their own natural principles (principia naturae). Of course, simply having the 
                                                
37 ST I-II.55.1 resp. 
38 Jean Porter asserts that the definition is from Peter Lombard’s Sentences. Here I have chosen to follow 
Thomas. See Porter, Nature as Reason, 163. 
39 ST I-II.55.4. 
40 ST I-II.61.2. 
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natural principles latent within us does not mean we possess any of the intellectual or moral 
virtues; those have to be developed or granted to us through the course of our life through 
acquired or infused virtues. 
In distinction from the intellectual and moral virtues, the three theological virtues—faith, 
hope, and love—have union with Christ as their end. They are related to “supernatural 
happiness,” i.e., “a happiness surpassing man’s nature [beatitudo naturam hominis excedens].”41 
According to Thomas, “the theological virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the 
natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end.”42 He then goes on to say: 
And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man’s natural 
principles (principia naturalia hominis) which enable him to act well according to his 
capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for 
man to receive from God some additional principles (quod superaddantur homini 
divinitus aliqua principia), whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even 
as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not 
without the Divine assistance. Such like principles are called theological virtues: first, 
because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God; secondly, because 
they are infused in us by God alone (a solo Deo nobis infunduntur); thirdly, because these 
virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.43 
 
Because divine happiness transcends our natural principles, God must superadd alia principia 
which direct us to God and are infused in us by God alone. Our principia naturalia are sufficient 
only for accomplishing those finite ends which God has willed as part of divine providence. 
Beyond such limited pursuits, we are wholly at the mercy of God, who infuses new supernatural 
principles in the form of faith, hope, and love. Faith is the infused intellectual principle of divine 
light in relation to supernatural truth; hope is the infused intention of the will in relation to the 
supernatural end; and love is the infused appetite of the will in relation to the supernatural, 
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spiritual union with God.44 The temporal “order of generation” is faith, then hope, and then love. 
But the ontic “order of perfection” is love, then faith and hope, “because both faith and hope are 
quickened by charity, and receive from charity their full complement as virtues.”45 
Thomas then addresses the cause of virtues, whether they are from within or from 
without. First, he asks whether virtues are in us “by nature.” While he notes the obvious point 
that only some people have virtue, and therefore virtue is not natural to human nature as such, he 
goes on to argue that “virtue is natural to man inchoatively [inchoationem].” This is the case with 
respect to the universal faculty of reason, where one finds “instilled by nature certain naturally 
known principles of both knowledge [scibilium] and action [agendorum], which are the nurseries 
[seminalia] of intellectual and moral virtues.”46 And yet each individual person, by virtue of his 
or her unique physical constitution, has a “natural aptitude” for certain virtues more than others. 
In any case, “all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not 
according to perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without [totaliter 
ab extrinseco].”47 Second, Thomas asks whether any virtues are acquired through habituation. As 
expected, he employs the same distinction between those directed toward natural human 
happiness and those virtues directed toward supernatural divine happiness, corresponding to the 
distinction from the previous article between those virtues for which we have a natural aptitude 
and those that are “entirely from without.” The former virtues can be acquired through human 
acts “inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason,” while the latter come to us wholly from God. 
It is important to note, however, that even though human beings are directed toward a 
“connatural end” by means of “natural principles,” Thomas insists that acquisition of virtue and 
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the realization of natural human happiness is impossible “without the Divine assistance.”48 All of 
the virtues, even those caused by habituation, fall within the scope of divine providence. Third, 
Thomas investigates whether virtues are infused. While the theological virtues themselves are, of 
course, infused by God, Thomas goes further and insists that the habits and principles, of which 
the theological virtues are perfections, must also be infused: “The power of those naturally 
instilled principles [principia naturaliter indita] does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. 
Consequently man needs in addition [superaddita] to be perfected by other principles [alia 
principia] in relation to his supernatural end.”49 
While Thomas does not make it as clear as it could be, these alia principia take the form 
of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.50 Thomas very carefully distinguishes the gifts from the virtues, 
since the virtues themselves are gifts from God which bring about a perfection in the recipient. 
The distinction he makes between gifts and virtues alludes to the earlier distinction between the 
principia naturalia given with creation and the alia principia that are infused by God. He says 
that “in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within him, viz. the reason; the other 
extrinsic to him, viz. God.”51 Then he asserts that “whatever is moved must be proportionate to 
its mover,” and thus the one moved by God must have “a disposition whereby it is disposed to be 
well moved by its mover,” a disposition which enables one “to receive a higher teaching from his 
master.” These perfections which dispose one to be moved by God “are called gifts, not only 
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50 Thomas does not make a clear distinction between the “gift of the Holy Spirit (donum spiritus sancti)” and 
the “gifts of the Holy Spirit (dona spiritus sancti),” and this results in some confusion, since the former can be taken 
as a subjective or objective genitive. The former could be interpreted as the gift of the person of the Spirit, while the 
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and the latter the benefits of that union. In any case, it’s important to note that Thomas identifies seven gifts of the 
Holy Sprit, four in relation to the intellect (wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel) and three in relation to 
the will (piety, fortitude, and fear). Thomas’s aligns these gifts with the intellectual and moral virtues, arguing that 
“these gifts extend to all those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend” (I-II.68.4 resp.). In a 
way, the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the virtues of intellect and will are two sides of one divine-human reality: the 
gifts initiate and perfect the human acts of virtue. 
51 ST I-II.68.1 resp. 
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because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable 
to the Divine inspiration.”52 The gifts elevate and perfect human nature for the sake of acts which 
“are higher than acts of virtue”—virtue here meaning the “merely human”53 intellectual and 
moral virtues. Specifically, the “higher” acts are the theological virtues. 
Thomas goes on to clarify the nature of the gifts even further, arguing that “the gifts are 
perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost,” and 
therefore “the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the 
Holy Ghost.”54 The circularity of these statements—the Holy Spirit acts in human persons to 
make them well-disposed for the acts of the Holy Spirit—is precisely the point: the theological 
virtues are enclosed entirely within the scope of God’s providential action, i.e., God’s willing, 
knowing, and loving of creation through Word and Spirit. The question whether the virtues or 
the gifts come first is analogous to asking whether nature or grace comes first: it depends 
somewhat on one’s perspective, but at the end of the day, grace and gifts always come first. 
Nature is situated within God’s gracious and providential determination of creation, and the 
virtues are situated within the Holy Spirit’s gifting of the human person for works of virtue, and 
thus for happiness, both human and divine. Consequently, on the one hand, Thomas says that the 
theological virtues “are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots,” and therefore the gifts are 
all derived from the virtues of faith, hope, and love, by which one is united to God.55 And yet, on 
the other hand, he clearly says that, for the theological virtues, “the motion of reason does not 
suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost [nisi desuper 
adsit instinctus et motio spiritus sancti]. . . . Therefore, in order to accomplish this [supernatural] 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 John I. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
154. 
54 ST I-II.68.3 resp. 
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end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost [donum spiritus sancti].”56 The 
point is that, in order to understand Thomas’s account of the virtues, one must read each article 
within its broader theological context. However one looks at it, virtue originates in the 
prompting and gifting of the Spirit, is perfected through the gifts of the Spirit, and has its telos in 
the human person’s union with God in accordance with the Spirit. 
At this point, we can diagram Thomas’s theological anthropology with respect to the 
virtues in the following way: 
 Human Virtues  Theological Virtues 
  [ ]   Infused Virtues (gifts of the Spirit) 
  Acquired Virtues  Infused Principles (gifts of the Spirit) 
  Natural Principles  [ ] 
While we still have yet to develop the role of the Holy Spirit in the theological virtue of faith, the 
point here is that the theological virtues are entirely enveloped within the pneumatological-
providential work of God. There are no principia naturalia which provide a bridge between the 
natural human being and the supernatural work of grace. As Thomas repeatedly says, the 
supernatural beatitude realized proleptically in the theological virtues are totaliter ab extrinseco. 
That’s not to say the theological virtues do not make use of anthropological givens like intellect 
and will; rather, it is to insist that there is no way from “here” to “there,” so to speak, when it 
comes to such virtuous activity. The initiative comes wholly from God; it is entirely extra nos. 
Moreover, even the human virtues fall entirely within the scope of God’s providential ordering 
of creation towards its final end. 
Before turning to the virtue of faith, I wish to conclude this section by reviewing the 
argument thus far and developing the role of providence a little further. In order to properly 
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understand Thomas’s account of the virtues, I have argued that one must situate his treatise on 
habits and virtues within the context of his doctrine of creation and providence. Since Thomas 
mentions providence very rarely in the course of discussing the virtues, it can give the 
impression, when certain articles are read in isolation, that the acquired intellectual and moral 
virtues—and the corresponding connatural end of human happiness—are self-actualized without 
divine assistance, and that God is involved only in bringing about humanity’s supernatural end. 
This way of reading Thomas facilitates a clean bifurcation between a philosophical ethics 
(focusing on natural human ends) and a theological ethics (focusing on our supernatural divine 
end). But as we have already seen, Thomas locates his ethics within the broader context of divine 
providence, in which God is the active causal agent of all creaturely actions. Even in those 
actions originating in natural human principles, Thomas says that one can do good works 
“according to them, but not, however, excluding the operation of God, who works inwardly 
[interius operatur] in every nature and in every will.”57 God directs nature like an archer directs 
an arrow, though God does so without doing violence to creaturely freedom and contingency. 
God simultaneously “has immediate providence over everything [Deus immediate omnibus 
providet]” and “governs things inferior by superior . . . so that the dignity of causality is imparted 
even to creatures.”58 We can therefore say that the acquisition of virtues is providentially willed 
and actualized by God as part of the divine movement of creation toward its final telos. 
Finally, the dogmatic ground for the historical realization of human happiness is, I 
suggest, found in the doctrine of divine predestination (ST I, q. 23). Thomas states that God’s 
providential activity of predestination directs creaturely realities towards their end. And, as 
Thomas states repeatedly, the end of creation is twofold: one end “exceeds all proportion and 
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faculty of created nature, and this end is life eternal”; the other end “is proportionate to created 
nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature.”59 Again, 
Thomas uses the example of the archer and the arrow. Nature itself is predestined and guided 
toward its end, whether the natural end of human happiness or the supernatural end of eternal 
beatitude. And thus “a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it 
were, by God,”60 and “if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does 
not allot it without election, since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give 
to others.”61 Divine predestination is the eternal “backdrop,” so to speak, for what occurs in time 
as human beings seek to attain to human happiness. Providence does not restrict creaturely 
freedom but rather makes it possible; free will is not destroyed but is actually the result of God’s 
providential activity.62 It is important to keep in mind that Thomas’s account of the virtues has 
its basis in the doctrine of providence and predestination, not only to ensure that a Thomistic 
ethics is theological from beginning to end, but also to emphasize the uniquely theological nature 
of faith, hope, and love. The theological virtues are granted as part of the mystery of divine 
election, coming to us from God as pneumatological gifts for the sake of realizing creation’s 
final telos and, specifically, humanity’s perfect participation in divine beatitude through union 
with Christ. With this in mind, we turn to the virtue of faith. 
 
Faith: Thomas Aquinas’s pneumatological pisteology 
Thomas’s doctrine of faith comes at the start of the Secunda Secundae, in which 
questions 1-46 are devoted to his explication of the three theological virtues, with questions 1-16 
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focusing on faith in particular. As we have already seen from the Prima Secundae, Thomas 
identifies faith as a theological virtue of the intellect. As a theological virtue, faith is a 
meritorious free act of the intellect at the behest of the will; as a theological virtue, faith is an act 
originating in God’s grace and ordered to the Divine truth by a supernatural infusion of the 
Spirit’s power. Therefore, “faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and charity perfect the 
appetitive part” of the soul.63 As a kind of summary statement, Thomas defines faith as “an act of 
the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God 
[actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinae ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motae per gratiam].”64 
First, I will briefly examine how intellect and will relate to each other in faith, and then, second, I 
will show how Thomas grounds faith in the gifting of the Holy Spirit. 
 
Intellect and will: the anthropology of faith 
Faith, according to Thomas, is an assent of the intellect (assensus intellectus) moved by 
the will: “Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is believed . . . through an act of 
choice [electio].”65 Intellect and will are both involved in the act of faith, and thus the object of 
faith can be looked at from the perspective of the intellect or the will. Thomas does this when he 
distinguishes between three forms of belief: credere Deum (believing about God), credere Deo 
(believing God), and credere in Deum (believing in God).66 The first two relate to the intellect, 
as the material and formal objects of faith, respectively: to “believe about God” is to believe 
those things which are related to God, while to “believe God” is to adhere to God as the First 
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Truth who authoritatively determines the material objects of our faith. The third form of belief, 
credere in Deum, relates to the will, because we “believe in God” as our final end and good. The 
order of these forms of belief is important: we believe things about God (credere Deum) because 
we believe the authority of God (credere Deo), which itself “responds to believing for the sake 
of attaining God” as our perfecting end (credere in Deum).67 The formal object of faith is 
therefore God, the First Truth, while the material object includes the propositional articles of the 
Creed and the facts narrated in Scripture insofar as these are related to God. This assent of the 
intellect is volitionally motivated by divine grace which moves the believer to assent to these 
truths for the sake of attaining the bonum universale. 
While faith involves both the intellect and the will, in accordance with the anthropology 
Thomas lays out in the Prima Secundae, the distinction between intellect and will—and the 
location of faith primarily in the intellect—is what enables him to distinguish between “living” 
or “formed” faith (fides formata) and “lifeless” or “unformed” faith (fides informis).68 The 
distinction, which the Reformers strongly opposed, depends on Thomas’s view that “since faith 
is a perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which pertains to the intellect,” and 
therefore “what pertains to the will does not pertain directly to faith.”69 Thomas can even say that 
the charity “which gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith.”70 While these 
statements seem flatly opposed to the Reformational conception of faith—and certainly there are 
differences, as I will discuss later—there is more to be said. First, when Thomas says that the 
command of the will is “accidental” and thus not “essential” to faith, he does not mean that 
unformed faith is still a virtue. In the following article, he says that only fides formata is a virtue, 
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because a virtue is a good act that makes the agent good, and in order for faith to be a good act, 
“two things are required . . . one of which is that the intellect should infallibly tend to its object, 
which is the true; while the other is that the will should be infallibly directed to the last end, on 
account of which it assents to the true: and both of these are to be found in the act of living 
faith.”71 He goes on to say that “lifeless faith is not a virtue,” because “it has not its due 
perfection as regards the will.” In short, intellect and will are both necessary for there to be a 
virtue of faith. Second, Thomas has already said that a virtue cannot be in more than one power 
of the soul (ST I-II, q. 56). Instead, a virtue must belong primarily to one power, “while it 
extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one power is 
moved by another, and one power receives from another.”72 With this rule in place, it is only 
natural for him to locate faith in the intellect, since the object of faith, in his view, is the veritas 
prima, and thus faith is a species of belief.73 Third, as I will argue later, even the assensus 
intellectus is pneumatologically conditioned, arising as part of the Spirit’s inspiration and 
infusion of understanding. 
For many Protestants, Thomas’s location of faith essentially in the intellect is seen as a 
decision to side with Aristotle over against Scripture. The actual situation is much more complex 
than this. For starters, Thomas is seeking a via media of sorts between Aristotle and Augustine.74 
In relation to Aristotle, Thomas agrees with Aristotle that faith (pistis or fides) is “a mean 
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between science [scientia] and opinion [opinio].”75 With opinion, faith concerns something that 
is not seen; with science, faith is held with certainty or a firmness of conviction. Even so, 
Thomas argues against Aristotle’s conception of pistis: 
The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on human reasoning in a conclusion 
which does not follow, of necessity, from its premises; and which is subject to be false: 
hence such like faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are speaking 
is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and consequently its object cannot be 
anything false; so that faith of this kind can be a virtue.76 
 
According to Thomas, the faith of which Aristotle speaks is virtually indistinguishable from 
mere opinion, because it relies on merely human authority. What differentiates true faith is the 
authority of God’s revelation. Faith’s source is divine, and for that reason, it is an infallible 
intellectual assent. Instead of “mere belief in the Aristotelian sense,”77 Thomas is interested in 
biblical, religious faith. In relation to Augustine, by contrast, Thomas acknowledges that, in his 
short treatise, On the Predestination of the Saints, Augustine says, “faith resides in the believer’s 
will.”78 But Thomas also notes that, in this same treatise, Augustine says that belief is “to think 
with assent.”79 Not surprisingly, then, Thomas gives the second statement greater hermeneutical 
weight, and so interprets the former in light of the latter. 
The key to Thomas’s pisteology is not primarily Aristotle or Augustine, but rather 
Hebrews 11:1: “faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence [argumentum] of 
things that appear not.” While the passage appears early in his treatise on faith, the verse 
becomes central to the argument in the fourth question of the Secunda Secundae.80 Thomas asks 
whether the verse offers a “fitting definition” of faith. He says that it does, since “this definition 
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overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can be defined, albeit the words 
themselves are not arranged in the form of a definition.”81 Thomas argues that the two clauses—
“things to be hoped for” and “things that appear not”—together capture the dual aspect of faith 
as related to both intellect and will. The act of faith is “related both to the object of the will, i.e. 
to the good and the end, and to the object of the intellect, i.e. to the true.”82 The object of the will 
is something for which we hope, while the object of the intellect is something unseen, since “to 
see the truth is to possess it,” in which case faith and hope would be unnecessary. While there are 
two objects in accordance with the two powers of intellect and will, Thomas argues that these are 
one and the same object. Faith is “an act of the intellect determinate to one object by the will’s 
command,” and therefore the objects of intellect and will must be “in proportion to one 
another.”83 Furthermore, Thomas interprets the word “evidence” as referring to the mean 
between opinion and doubt, on the one hand, and science and understanding on the other. It is an 
infallible conviction regarding the veritas prima which we cannot see. Thomas concludes by 
translating Heb. 11:1 into his own scholastic definition of faith: “faith is a habit of the mind, 
whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent.”84 
 
Naturalists and voluntarists: the Thomistic debate regarding pisteology 
The intricacy and occasional ambiguity regarding the relation between intellect and will 
in Thomas’s pisteology has led to a rather fruitless debate among Thomistic scholars over which 
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is to be prioritized. The debate is between two camps, commonly referred to as the “naturalists” 
and the “voluntarists.”85 Both of these positions are attempts at articulating the warrant of faith’s 
assent in Thomas’s theology apart from attending to the significance of divine grace. The 
naturalist position is represented well by someone like Terence Penelhum.86 The naturalist 
argues that, according to Thomas, one can assent to faith by accepting (1) metaphysical 
arguments from natural theology and (2) credibility arguments from the testimony of miracles, 
Scripture, and the history of the church.87 The naturalist believes that, on the basis of purely 
natural arguments and evidence, one “has, or can have, evidence sufficient to establish 
conclusively the authority of whoever speaks to him,” so that “even though he may need grace to 
enable him to accept what it says without reluctance, he will not need it because of any 
inconclusiveness in what he hears.”88 The heart of the problem with the naturalist position is that 
Penelhum and the other naturalists have rejected the need for any gift of grace in the intellect. 
Grace is confined to the role of the will in assenting “without reluctance.” The assensus 
intellectus can be done naturally, that is, purely on the basis of rational arguments via natural 
intellectual powers. In short, the naturalist position places all the emphasis on the act of the 
intellect, so that the will is only necessary to confirm what one’s natural intellectual powers have 
already deemed to be true. 
The voluntarist position, by contrast—whose proponents include James Ross and 
Eleonore Stump—places all the emphasis on the act of the will in commanding an assent for 
which there is insufficient rational evidence. In other words, the voluntarist position takes up 
where the naturalists leave off. Assuming that the evidence that one can gain on purely natural 
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grounds is insufficient to itself command assent, the voluntarists believe that a sheer act of the 
will is required to fill that gap in the evidence. The basis for this act of will is the desired end 
result: viz. eternal blessedness. In the absence, then, of compelling evidence, one engages in a bit 
of “wishful thinking” because of one’s desire for heavenly rewards. The warrant for making this 
voluntary “leap of faith” is that there are no other plausible options on the table for attaining this 
eternal happiness. And thus the will must command assent. The problems with this position as an 
interpretation of Thomas are, again, manifold, though here it should suffice to point out that, in 
Thomas’s theological anthropology, the will commands only because the intellect has rationally 
deliberated (and chosen) the best means to attain the Good. The voluntarist position ignores the 
process of deliberation, hence violating Thomas’s clear statement in Prima Secundae that 
“command is an act of the reason, presupposing, however, an act of will.”89  
Like the naturalists, the voluntarists argue for a view of faith that marginalizes, if not 
entirely ignores, the necessity of divine grace.90 Both positions attempt to explain why faith is 
warranted. That is, they seek to make faith rationally acceptable. The origin of their confusion is 
perhaps already found in the passage from Prima Secundae just mentioned, where Thomas goes 
on to say that “the reason reasons about willing, and the will wills to reason,” with the result 
“that the act of the reason precedes the act of the will, and conversely.” Intellect and will are 
mutually imbricated, we might say; they imply each other. But that is only half the problem. The 
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other side is the fact that these two positions do not address the supernatural character of the 
theological virtues, Thomas’s statements regarding the infused lumen fidei, and the 
pneumatological gifts of understanding and knowledge. While I have already touched on the 
general relation between the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, I will now 
examine this relationship in the concrete context of faith. 
 
Thomas’s pneumatological pisteology 
Thomas connects each of the seven virtues—four cardinal and three theological—with at 
least one gift of the Holy Spirit. For example, he links the gift of wisdom with charity, and the 
gift of fear with hope. Thomas connects faith to the gifts of understanding and knowledge, since 
faith is a virtue of the intellect, and these he treats in questions 8-9 of the Secunda Secundae. 
Earlier I noted, in relation to Thomas’s account of the virtues in Prima Secundae, that the role of 
the Holy Spirit is complicated: on the one hand, the Spirit is active in eliciting the theological 
virtues; on the other hand, however, the Spirit responds to and presupposes the theological 
virtues. We see this same (intentional?) ambiguity in the section on faith. He begins his 
discussion of the gifts by stating that the gifts of understanding and knowledge “respond to the 
virtue of faith,”91 which seems to imply that faith comes first in relation to the gifts; but later he 
says that faith responds to the gift of understanding, since faith is the fruit of what the Spirit does 
in us.92 The confusion arises because Thomas wants to say both that faith is possible apart from 
the pneumatological gifts of understanding and knowledge and that faith is impossible without 
the gift of the Spirit. Since it is the latter claim which is the more controversial—in that more 
                                                
91 ST II-II.8 pr. Cf. II-II.8.5 arg. 3: “the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith, according to Isa. 
7:9, following another reading: ‘If you will not believe you shall not understand.’ Now faith can be without 
sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding can be without it [grace].” Thomas responds to this by making 
a distinction between faith as “mere assent” and understanding as “a certain perception of the truth.” 
92 ST II-II.8.8. 
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interpreters of Thomas are uncomfortable with the notion that faith qua assensus intellectus 
requires the work of the Spirit—I will focus on this problem first and then seek to understand the 
former in light of it. 
Throughout his treatment of faith, Thomas emphasizes that faith is a supernatural act for 
which there are no principia naturalia capable of assisting the assensus intellectus from our side. 
Specifically, Thomas says that two things are necessary for faith: (1) the revelation from God of 
the “first truth” (along with the various articles of faith) which humanity must believe, (2) the 
assent of the intellect to the divine truth. The first is quite clearly from God, but what about the 
second? Thomas is unequivocal in his rejection of Pelagianism: “since man, by assenting to 
matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some 
supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the 
assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.”93 In other 
words, faith is entirely a Deo, both in terms of revelation and the principium supernaturalis. 
Elsewhere, Thomas uses the metaphor of light to argue for the same basic point: 
Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural light of his intellect (per naturale 
lumen intellectus), so does a virtuous man, by the habit of virtue, judge aright of things 
concerning that virtue; and in this way, by the light of faith (lumen fidei) which God 
infuses in him [divinitus infusum homini], a man assents to matters of faith and not to 
those which are against faith. Consequently “there is no” danger or “condemnation to 
them that are in Christ Jesus,” and whom He has enlightened by faith [illuminati per 
fidem].94 
 
Here we see that Thomas connects the concept of enlightenment with our act of assent. God is 
the source of this lumen fidei. We are capable of assenting to the First Truth and, inter alia, the 
articles of the creed only because God has enlightened us.95 
                                                
93 ST II-II.6.1 resp. Emphasis added. 
94 ST II-II.2.3 ad 2; translation modified. 
95 We find this view in some of his earlier works as well. In De veritate, Thomas says that faith is “from infused 
light” (14.2). And in Scriptum super libros sententiarum, he writes: “Faith can be called an argument insofar as the 
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With this in mind, we can turn to Thomas’s account of the gift of understanding, where 
he discusses whether understanding comes from the Holy Spirit: 
Now the natural light of our understanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach to a 
certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernatural light [supernaturalis lumen] 
in order to penetrate further still so as to know what it cannot know by its natural light: 
and this supernatural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift of understanding 
[donum intellectus].96 
 
The “supernatural light” here in 8.1 does the same work assigned by Thomas to the “supernatural 
principle” in 6.1, and it is equivalent with the lumen fidei mentioned in 2.3. Therefore, the 
supernatural light by which one assents to matters of faith is identical with the pneumatological 
donum intellectus. Moreover, this accords with what he says in Prima Secundae regarding the 
gifts of the Holy Spirit, where he says that human reason has a double perfection: a “natural 
perfection,” viz. “the natural light of reason,” and a “supernatural perfection,” viz. the 
theological virtues. For the latter, human beings must have superadded to them “the prompting or 
motion of the Holy Ghost.”97 In other words, the entirety of faith arises as a result of Word and 
Spirit: the Word as the revelation from God to humanity, and the Spirit as the gift of God’s grace 
working inwardly within those predestined by God to assent to these revealed truths. 
What then is the basis for Thomas asserting that faith is possible apart from these gifts? 
Here, admittedly, things become a bit murky. The problem is that Thomas, as a Catholic 
theologian, believes that a mortal sin results in the loss of one’s state of grace, and thus the loss 
of the virtue of faith—but not of the merely intellectual assent to matters of truth (recall the 
distinction between “formed” and “unformed” faith). With the loss of one’s state of grace, one 
also loses the Holy Spirit’s gifts, since the Spirit is only active in those who have sanctifying 
                                                                                                                                                       
infused light, which is the habit of faith, makes manifest the articles [of faith], just as the intellectual light makes 
manifest principles naturally known” (III.23.2.1.ad 4). Quoted in Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas, 
190. 
96 ST II-II.8.1 resp. Emphasis added. 
97 ST I-II.68.2 resp. 
Congdon 31 
grace. Having this in mind, it becomes clear that there is an aporia in Thomas’s pisteology. See 
the following two statements in which he attempts to separate faith from the gift of 
understanding: 
Faith implies merely assent [solus assensus] to what is proposed, but understanding 
implies a certain perception of the truth.98 
 
The gift of understanding is about the first principles of that knowledge which is 
conferred by grace; but otherwise than faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, 
while it belongs to the gift of understanding to penetrate [penetrare] with the mind the 
things that are said.99 
 
Regarding the first, as I noted above, Thomas has already made it clear that the assensus 
intellectus itself requires the inner working of the Spirit by way of a supernatural illumination of 
the truth. The second statement only further confuses matters by introducing a new distinction, 
nowhere else clarified, between assenting to something and penetrating something with the 
mind. Things are only made murkier when he says, in the context of the gift of knowledge, that 
these two intellectual gifts of the Spirit are necessary “in order that the human intellect may 
perfectly assent [perfecte assentiat] to the truth of the faith.”100 The distinction between 
“formed” and “unformed” faith does not apply here, since that has to do with the will’s 
command, whereas the aporia here has to do with the reason’s assent. And most of the evidence 
points squarely to the conclusion that the assent itself is moved by the Holy Spirit, and thus it is 
an act of divine grace. As Thomas says in his treatise on grace in the Prima Secundae, “grace is a 
light of the soul,” the “light of truth,”101 and it is precisely this supernatural light of grace which 
is necessary in the act of faith. 
                                                
98 ST II-II.8.5 ad 3. 
99 ST II-II.8.6 ad 2; translation modified. 
100 ST II-II.9.1 resp. Emphasis added. This passage probably helps my case, in that one could read it as implying 
that “mere assent” requires the gift of understanding, while “perfect assent” requires the gift of knowledge in 
addition. 
101 ST I-II.110.1 s.c. 
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Carl Still is entirely correct when he says that Thomas’s discussion of faith “reveal[s] 
how little concerned he is with providing reasons that would justify faith.”102 As Still notes, any 
attempt to “give an intellectual justification of faith” on Thomistic grounds must finally fail, 
because the reality of faith is divine grace “all the way down,” so to speak. But can we say 
anything more? I suggest that we situate faith within the doctrine of providence outlined above. 
Creation derives from and is divinely ordained to the perfect and universal good that is God. 
Creation is wholly circumscribed by the transcendently immanent grace of God who acts 
continuously and inwardly by means of Word and Spirit. And thus, as I noted earlier, Thomas 
says: 
Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural light, 
and moving us to understand and speak the truth, but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying 
grace, or as bestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this only takes place 
with regard to certain truths that are known and spoken, and especially in regard to such 
as pertain to faith.103 
 
The Holy Spirit is active everywhere, actualizing the intellect’s natural powers, but uniquely and 
most intensively active in the supernatural activity of faith—as well as in the other theological 
virtues. The Spirit’s supernatural illumination of the intellect is the movement of sanctifying 
grace, and it comes to us from without according to the mystery of God’s predestinating 
decision. By the Spirit alone (solo Spiritu), God unites us to the divine nature and infuses the 
virtues of faith, hope, and love in us: 
And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the acquired virtues, 
which are ordained to this natural light, so also the light of grace which is a participation 
of the Divine Nature is something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and 
are ordained to this light. . . . For as the acquired virtues enable a man to walk, in 
accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the infused virtues enable a man to 
walk as befits the light of grace.104 
 
                                                
102 Still, “Thomas Aquinas on the Assent of Faith,” 126. 
103 ST I-II.109.1 resp. and ad 1. 
104 ST I-II.110.3 resp. Emphasis added. 
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While Thomas never fully clarifies the nature of faith, the above passage encapsulates the 
heart of his pisteology: the virtue of faith is both derived from and ordered to the lumen gratiae, 
the lumen supernaturalis. And since this light is identical with the pneumatological gift of 
understanding, as Thomas makes clear in the Secunda Secundae, we can say that faith is both 
derived from and ordained to the gifts of the Spirit. The Spirit is the ground and end, the origin 
and telos, of faith, hope, and love. This corresponds perfectly with the fact that Word and Spirit 
are the ground and end of creation according to divine providence. Nature and grace are both 
situated within the metanarrative of God’s providential willing, knowing, and loving of the 
creature. Thomas’s attempt to separate faith from the pneumatological gifts only makes sense 
from the perspective of faith as an act ordained toward the light of grace. But that is only half of 
Thomas’s pisteology. The other half, in correspondence to his doctrine of creation in general, 
understands faith as derived from the light of grace. Faith, like creation, comes from God and 
moves toward God through the continuous and gracious activity of God. Faith is a 
pneumatological reality—solo Spiritu—from beginning to end.  
The mystery of faith is, quite simply, the mystery of God’s providence. The reason why 
Thomas is not concerned with providing “an intellectual justification of faith” is because the 
divine gift of faith is a manifestation of the hidden mystery of divine predestination. Two 
passages make this clear. In the first, Thomas is replying to the objection that because explicit 
belief is outside natural human capacity, it cannot be demanded of us. In his response he quotes 
Augustine: “But with the help of grace we can do this [i.e., believe the articles of faith], for this 
help ‘to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully given; and from whom it is withheld 
it is justly withheld, as a punishment of a previous, or at least of original, sin,’ as Augustine 
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states.”105 The second passage comes from his discussion of grace, in the same passage where he 
talks about grace as “a light of the soul,” which implies a connection with the infused light of 
faith: 
Accordingly when a man is said to have the grace of God, there is signified something 
bestowed on man by God. Nevertheless the grace of God sometimes signifies God’s 
eternal love, as we say the grace of predestination, inasmuch as God gratuitously and not 
from merits predestines or elects some; for it is written (Ephesians 1:5): “He hath 
predestinated us into the adoption of children . . . unto the praise of the glory of His 
grace.”106 
 
At the end of the day, the ambiguities about faith are finally, for Thomas, ambiguities about why 
some are predestined and why others are not. The mystery of election, like the mysteries of the 
Trinity and incarnation, renders us mute, since it is a completely gratuitous act of divine love as 
part of God’s gracious movement of creation toward its final end. Our proper response to the gift 
of faith is therefore not an examination of the intellect and the will, but rather an expression of 
gratitude to God that “there is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus.” 
 
Conclusion: Thomas Aquinas in conversation with the Reformation 
In the quote with which I opened this paper, Calvin levels the following criticisms against 
the scholastic conception of faith: (1) by separating “unformed faith” from “formed faith,” 
Catholicism allows a person with “no sense of piety” to attain to salvation; (2) the scholastic 
pisteology, because it distinguishes between formed and unformed faith, separates faith from the 
Holy Spirit’s witness to our adoption, or as Calvin puts it, “it certainly looks as if they never 
thought about the unique gift of the Spirit”; and (3) the scholastic pisteology is cold and 
intellectual, when it should be situated in the heart. In light of our analysis, we can respond to 
these claims rather easily. First, Thomas rejects the view that unformed faith is salvific, because 
                                                
105 ST II-II.2.5 ad 1. 
106 ST I-II.110.1 resp. Emphasis added. 
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without the command of the will it is not a meritorious virtue; unformed faith lacks the 
sanctifying grace of the Spirit. Second, Thomas’s pisteology, as we have seen, is thoroughly 
pneumatological: faith begins and ends with the gift of the Spirit. True faith is impossible for 
Thomas without the sanctifying witness of the Spirit. Thomas would no doubt agree with Calvin 
when he says that “faith rests upon the knowledge of Christ. And Christ cannot be known apart 
from the sanctification of his Spirit.”107 Finally, while faith is certainly more intellectual for 
Thomas than for the Reformers, for the simple fact that faith is a species of belief, he clearly 
argues that faith is an act of the intellect and the will together: “to believe is an act of the 
intellect, inasmuch as the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will and the 
intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be perfected in this way. Consequently, if the 
act of faith is to be perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the intellect.”108 
The differences that remain between the Reformers and Thomas when it comes to faith 
have to do with which passages from Scripture each prioritizes. While it’s certainly true that 
Thomas depends more upon Aristotle, while the Reformers depend more upon Augustine, I 
suggest that, in charity to both, the difference between them should be viewed as the difference 
between Heb. 11:1 and Rom. 10:10. Calvin and the other Reformers place the emphasis on 
“believing with the heart,” whereas Thomas places the emphasis on the “evidence of things that 
appear not.” Those who persist in viewing Thomas Aquinas’s pisteology as a philosophical 
conception of belief, instead of as a thoroughly theological doctrine of faith, end up doing him a 
great injustice. 
Instead of pitting Thomas Aquinas against John Calvin, it might be more productive to 
see the theological promises and shortcomings of both. The bulk of this paper has been an 
                                                
107 Calvin, Institutes, 3.2.8. 
108 ST II-II.4.2 resp. 
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attempt to see the promise of a Thomistic-pneumatological pisteology. But that does not mean 
there are not places where we might need to think beyond Thomas, as well as beyond the 
Reformers. One verse overlooked or suppressed by both theologians is Heb. 12:2, which declares 
Jesus to be the “author and perfecter of our faith.” Calvin fails to mention the verse anywhere in 
his Institutes,109 and when it appears in Thomas, it is explained away, because Jesus cannot have 
faith by virtue of the unio hypostatica with the divine Logos.110 According to Thomas, in the 
hypostatic union, Jesus directly sees the divine essence, the veritas prima, and therefore based on 
the definition of faith established by Heb. 11:1, Jesus cannot have faith. Thomas deliberately 
reads Heb. 12:2 in the light of Heb. 11:1 and his particular understanding of the incarnation. 
What distinguishes Thomas Aquinas from Luther or Calvin or Barth is not Thomas’s 
“Babylonian captivity,” but rather his particular interpretation of Scripture and his corresponding 
christology. While the future of Catholic-Protestant relations extends well beyond Thomas, it 
would be worth the effort for Protestants to engage Thomas anew—interpreting him as a 
“sapiential” theologian111 who grounds soteriology in a robust account of creation and 
                                                
109 At one point, Calvin does speak about faith in a very christological way that seems to imply Heb. 12:2. 
Drawing on Augustine’s theology, he writes: “Augustine has finely spoken of this matter: in discussing the goal of 
faith, he teaches that we must know our destination and the way to it. Then, immediately after, he infers that the way 
that is most fortified against all errors is he who was both God and man: namely, as God he is the destination to 
which we move; as man, the path by which we go. Both are found in Christ alone. But, while Paul proclaims faith in 
God, he does not have in mind to overturn what he so often emphasizes concerning faith: namely, that all its stability 
rests in Christ. Peter, indeed, most effectively connects both, saying that through him we believe in God [1 Peter 
1:21]” (3.2.1). 
110 See ST III.7.3, where Thomas asks whether Christ had faith. He rejects that notion because “from the first 
moment of His conception Christ saw God’s Essence fully . . . . Hence there could be no faith in Him.” 
111 In his analysis of Luther and Thomas Aquinas, Otto Hermann Pesch frames their relationship in a way that 
sheds light on the different ways Barth and Bultmann approach the truth of theological statements. According to 
Pesch, Luther is an existential theologian while Thomas is a sapiential theologian: “Existential theology is the way 
of doing theology from within the self-actuation of our existence in faith, as we submit to God in the obedience of 
faith. Its affirmations are so formulated that the actual faith and confession of the speaker are not merely necessary 
presuppositions but are reflexly thematized. Sapiential theology is the way of doing theology from outside one’s 
self-actuation in the existence of faith, in the sense that in its doctrinal statements the faith and confession of the 
speaker is the enduring presupposition, but is not thematic within this theology. This theology strives to mirror and 
recapitulate God’s own thoughts about the world, men, and history, insofar as God has disclosed them.” Otto 
Hermann Pesch, “Existential and Sapiential Theology—The Theological Confrontation Between Luther and 
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providence. Within the scope of God’s providence, Thomas includes God’s transcendent-
immanent activity through Word and Spirit and the correlative creaturely activity, specifically 
the human and theological virtues. Having this as a starting-point, perhaps we can finally 
dispense with the myths of a purely philosophical or Tridentine Thomas, and learn to think with 
and after Thomas Aquinas—not as part of a Catholic or Protestant polemic, but simply as part of 
the “great cloud of witnesses” (Heb. 12:1). 
 
                                                                                                                                                       




Barad, Judith A. Consent: The Means to an Active Faith According to St. Thomas Aquinas. Vol. 
126, American University Studies, Series V: Philosophy. New York: Peter Lang, 1992. 
Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Translated by Ford Lewis Battles. Edited by 
John T. McNeill. 2 vols. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006. 
Hoonhout, Michael A. “Grounding Providence in the Theology of the Creator: The Exemplarity 
of Thomas Aquinas.” Heythrop Journal 43, no. 1 (2002): 1. 
Jenkins, John I. Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997. 
Min, Anselm K. Paths to the Triune God: An Encounter between Aquinas and Recent 
Theologies. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. 
Penelhum, Terence. “The Analysis of Faith in St Thomas Aquinas.” Religious Studies 13, no. 2 
(1977): 133-54. 
Pesch, Otto Hermann. “Existential and Sapiential Theology—The Theological Confrontation 
Between Luther and Thomas Aquinas.” In Catholic Scholars Dialogue with Luther, 
edited by Jared Wicks, 61-81. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970. 
Porter, Jean. Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law. Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2004. 
Potts, Timothy C. “Aquinas on Belief and Faith.” In Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy: A 
Collection in Honor of Francis P. Clarke, edited by James F. Ross, 3-22. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood, 1971. 
Principe, Walter H. “Thomas Aquinas’ Spirituality.” In The Gilson Lectures on Thomas Aquinas, 
179-203. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008. 
Congdon 39 
Still, Carl N. “Thomas Aquinas on the Assent of Faith.” In Essays in Medieval Philosophy and 
Theology in Memory of Walter H. Principe, CSB: Fortresses and Launching Pads, edited 
by James R. Ginther and Carl N. Still, 121-33. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2005. 
Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 
Complete English ed. 5 vols. Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1981. 
———. Truth. Translated by Robert W. Mulligan, James V. McGlynn and Robert W. Schmidt. 3 
vols. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952. 
 
 
